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Abstract
The standard approach to logic in the literature in philosophy and mathemat-
ics, which has also been adopted in computer science, is to define a language (the
syntax), an appropriate class of models together with an interpretation of formu-
las in the language (the semantics), a collection of axioms and rules of inference
characterizing reasoning (the proof theory), and then relate the proof theory to
the semantics via soundness and completeness results. Here we consider an ap-
proach that is more common in the economics literature, which works purely at
the semantic, set-theoretic level. We provide set-theoretic completeness results for
a number of epistemic and conditional logics, and contrast the expressive power of
the syntactic and set-theoretic approaches.
∗This paper is almost identical to one that will appear in Annals of Mathematics and Artificial
Intelligence in 1999. The work was supported in part by NSF under grant IRI-96-25901 and by the Air
Force Office of Scientific Research under grant F49620-96-1-0323. A preliminary version of this work
appeared in the Fifth International Symposium on Articial Intelligence and Mathematics, 1998.
1 Introduction
The standard approach to logic in the literature in philosophy and mathematics, which
has also been adopted in computer science, is to define a language (the syntax), an
appropriate class of models together with an interpretation of formulas in the language
(the semantics), a collection of axioms and rules of inference characterizing reasoning
(the proof theory), and then relate the proof theory to the semantics via soundness and
completeness results.
The economics literature has also been interested in various logics, particularly logics
of knowledge and belief, and more recently conditional logic for counterfactual reasoning.
By and large, they dispense with syntax altogether, working purely at a set-theoretic,
semantic level. To understand how this is done, it is perhaps best to take as an example
epistemic logic.
Both approaches would start with what is called a frame in the logic literature, that
is, a set W of possible worlds and a binary relation K on W . Intuitively, (w,w′) ∈ K if in
world w, the agent considers w′ possible.1 In the economics literature, the K relation is
used to define an operator K on events (subsets ofW ). Taking K(w) = {w′ : (w,w′) ∈ K},
the operator K : 2W 7→ 2W is defined as follows:
K(E) = {w : K(w) ⊆ E}. (1)
We read K(E) as “the agent knows E”.
The mathematical/philosophical approach adds an extra level of indirection to this
more set-theoretic approach. A language for reasoning about knowledge is defined, start-
ing in the usual way with a set Φ of primitive propositions, and closing off under con-
junction, negation, and applications of the modal operator K. As is well known, to
give semantics to formulas in this language, we use a Kripke structure M = (W,K, pi),
where (W,K) is a frame, and pi is an interpretation that associates with each primitive
proposition and each world a truth value; that is, pi : Φ×W 7→ {true, false}. We then
define what it means for a formula ϕ to be true at a world w ∈ W , written (M,w) |= ϕ,
using the usual inductive definition.2 We can think of |= as just associating with each
formula ϕ an event [[ϕ]]M = {w : (M,w) |= ϕ} in structure M ([[ϕ]]M is called the inten-
sion of ϕ in the literature [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]). Not surprisingly,
[[Kϕ]]M = K([[ϕ]]M ); that is, we obtain the event associated with the formula Kϕ by
applying the operator K to the event associated with ϕ.
If all that is done with a formula is to translate it to an event, why bother with the
overhead of formulas and |=? Would it not just be simpler to dispense with formulas
and interpretations, and work directly with events? Syntax often plays an important
role—for example, it allows us to express concepts in a model-independent way. On the
1Actually, in the economics literature, it is more standard to consider a partition of W ; this is
equivalent to the case where K is an equivalence relation.
2Readers unfamiliar with the definition can find details in Section 2.
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other hand, if we have in mind an intended model all along, then perhaps it makes sense
to just work directly with events. For example, the model-checking approach, which
has been widely used in proving correctness of programs [Clarke, Emerson, and Sistla
1986], typically works with one fixed model, the one generated by the program whose
correctness we are trying to prove. Model checking has been advocated for epistemic
reasoning as well [Halpern and Vardi 1991]. Perhaps when using the model-checking
approach, it might make sense to work at the set-theoretic level.
Probability provides another example. Probabilists start by defining a particular
model—the probability space of interest—and then investigating its properties. As the
many texts on probability demonstrate, they have been able to prove a great many
results about probability by working purely at a set-theoretic level. While some logics
for reasoning about probability have been proposed, both propositional [Fagin, Halpern,
and Megiddo 1990] and first-order [Halpern 1990], they certainly do not begin to capture
all the subtleties of the reasoning we find in probability texts. For example, typical logics
of probability cannot express notions such as expectation and variance.
One of the apparent advantages of working with syntax is that we can define a proof
theory, that allows us to manipulate formulas in order to prove properties of interest. We
do not have to give up proof theory if we work at the set-theoretic level. For example, a
standard property of knowledge is introspection: if an agent knows a fact, then he knows
that he knows it, and if he does not know it, then he knows that he does not know it.
Syntactically, these properties are expressed as
• Kϕ⇒ KKϕ, and
• ¬Kϕ⇒ K¬Kϕ.
These properties have immediate set-theoretic analogues:
• K(E) ⊆ K(K(E)), and
• ¬K(E) ⊆ K(¬K(E)), where ¬ here denotes the set-theoretic complement.
As this example suggests, we can translate a syntactic axiom to a set-theoretic axiom by
1. replacing formulas by events,
2. replacing the modal operator K by the set operator K,
3. replacing the Boolean operations ¬,∧,∨ by their set-theoretic analogues ¬,∩,∪.
In this paper, I explore set-theoretic completeness proofs in the context of epistemic
logics and conditional logics. Both of these logics were introduced in the philosophical
literature [Hintikka 1962; Stalnaker 1968], but have been widely used in computer science
and AI. Epistemic logic has been used as a tool for analyzing multi-agent systems [Fagin,
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Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]; conditional logic has been used as a framework for
analyzing nonmonotonic reasoning [Boutilier 1994] and counterfactual reasoning [Lewis
1973]. It also has an important role to play in the analysis of causality [Lewis 1973], which
is becoming an increasingly important issue in AI as well [Pearl 1995]. Set-theoretic
completeness proofs for logics of knowledge and common knowledge are standard in the
economics literature (see, for example, [Aumann 1989; Milgrom 1981]). I compare them
to the more familiar syntactic completeness proofs in the philosophical literature, and
then do the same for conditional logic. For the logics considered here, every syntactic
operator has a semantic counterpart; thus, every property expressible syntactically has
a semantic counterpart. However, as we shall see, the converse is not always true. For
the logics considered here, the set-theoretic approach gives us extra expressive power,
allowing us to express more properties.
In part, this comes from the use of arbitrary (rather than just finite) unions and
intersections over events. We can already see the use of countable intersections and
unions in the context of probability theory. Although probability is typically taken to
be countably additive, this fact is not expressible in propositional logics of probability,
although it can be expressed once we allow countable operations.3 To be precise, suppose
that we have an operator of the form prp(ϕ) in the language, which is to be interpreted as
“the probability of ϕ is at least p”, and a corresponding operator on events µp(E). The
property of countable additivity cannot be expressed in a propositional logic, because we
do not have countable disjunctions. Indeed, in [Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo 1990], a
complete axiomatization is given for a logic of probability where, semantically, probability
is taken to be countably additive, but axiomatically, we require only finite additivity.
(This means that there will be nonstandard models of the theory where the probability
is finitely additive but not countably additive.) By way of contrast, countable additivity
is immediately expressible using µp though, using countable unions: If Ei, i ∈ I is a
countable collection of pairwise disjoint sets, then countable additivity just says
∩i∈Iµ
pi(Ei) ⊆ µ
p(∪i∈IEi),where p =
∑
i∈I pi.
In the case of knowledge, there is also a property that involves infinite intersection.
With only finite intersection, we have:
K(E) ∩ K(E ′) = K(E ∩ E ′). (2)
Once we allow infinite intersections, we have
∩j∈JKi(Ej) = Ki(∩j∈JEj) for any index set J and events Ej , j ∈ J . (3)
Clearly (3) implies (2). Somewhat surprisingly, it can be shown that if K is an equivalence
relation (that is, knowledge satisfies the properties of S5), then they are equivalent.
3For those readers unfamiliar with probability, finite additivity says that if E and F are disjoint sets,
then Pr(E ∪F ) = Pr(E) + Pr(F ). Countable additivity says that if E1, E2, . . . is a sequence of pairwise
disjoint sets, then Pr(∪iEi) =
∑
i
Pr(Ei).
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(This follows from Aumann’s set-theoretic completeness proof [1989], although I provide
a direct proof.) However, once we weaken the S5 properties, for example, if we consider
either S4 or K45, then the equivalence no longer holds, and we need the full strength
of (3) to get set-theoretic completeness proofs. At the syntactic level, this distinction is
lost, because infinite conjunctions cannot be expressed.
Of course, it can be argued that if we extended propositional logic to allow infi-
nite conjunctions, then these differences could be expressed perfectly well syntactically.
However, issues of expressiveness do not arise only for infinite conjunctions and disjunc-
tions. In the context of conditional logic, I show that there are properties that involve
only finite intersections and unions that have no analogue at the syntactic level. More-
over, even properties that can be captured syntactically are more naturally expressed
at the set-theoretic level. Finally, as we shall see, completeness proofs seem to be more
straightforward and transparent at the set-theoretic level, at least in the case of the logics
considered here.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I consider epistemic logic,
while in Section 3, I consider conditional logic. I conclude in Section 4.
2 Epistemic Logic
I start by reviewing the syntactic approach to epistemic logic, and then I examine how
the set-theoretic approach works.
2.1 The Syntactic Approach: A Review
For simplicity here, I consider single-agent epistemic logic; all the points I want to make
already arise in the single-agent case. I briefly review the syntax and semantics here for
those not familiar with it. We start with a nonempty set Φ of primitive propositions, and
close off under negation, conjunction, and applications of the modal operator K. Let LK
be the language consisting of all formulas that can be built up this way. Thus, a typical
formula in LK is K(¬K(p ∧ q)). We define implication and disjunction as usual.
A Kripke structure is a tuple M = (W,K, pi), as discussed in the introduction. We
define (M,w) |= ϕ by induction as follows:
(M,w) |= p (for a primitive proposition p ∈ Φ) iff pi(w, p) = true
(M,w) |= ϕ ∧ ϕ′ iff (M,w) |= ϕ and (M,w) |= ϕ′
(M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 6|= ϕ
(M,w) |= Kϕ iff (M,w′) |= ϕ for all w′ such that (w,w′) ∈ K.
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There are well-known soundness and completeness results for epistemic logic, that
show the close connection between the assumptions we make about K and axiomatic
properties. Consider the following axioms:
Prop. All substitution instances of tautologies of propositional calculus
K1. (Kϕ ∧K(ϕ⇒ ψ))⇒ Kψ, (Distribution Axiom)
K2. Kϕ⇒ ϕ, (Knowledge Axiom)
K3. Kϕ⇒ KKϕ, (Positive Introspection Axiom)
K4. ¬Kϕ⇒ K¬Kϕ, (Negative Introspection Axiom)
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ (Modus ponens)
Gen. From ϕ infer Kϕ (Knowledge Generalization)
The system with axioms and rules Prop, K1, MP, and Gen has been called K. If we
add K2 to K, we get T; if we add K3 to T, we get S4; if we add K4 to S4, we get S5;
finally, if we add K3 and K4 to K, we get K45. (Other systems can also be formed;
these are the ones I focus on here.)
Let M be the class of all Kripke structures. We are also interested in subclasses of
M where the K relation has various properties of interest. Let Mr (resp., Mrt; Met;
Mrst) consist of the Kripke structures where the K relation is reflexive (resp., reflexive
and transitive; Euclidean4 and transitive; reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, i.e., an
equivalence relation).
Theorem 2.1: For formulas in the language LK:
(a) K is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to M,
(c) T is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Mr,
(c) S4 is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Mrt,
(d) K45 is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Met.
(e) S5 is a sound and complete axiomatization with respect to Mrst.
4A relation R is Euclidean if (s, t), (s, u) ∈ R implies that (t, u) ∈ R.
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2.2 The Set-Theoretic Approach
In the set-theoretic approach, we just start with a frame (W,K). We can then define an
operator K as in Equation 1 in the Introduction. Consider the following properties of the
K operator:
A1. K(E) ∩ K(E ′) = K(E ∩ E ′)
A2. K(E) ⊆ E
A3. K(E) ⊆ K(K(E))
A4. ¬K(E) ⊆ K(¬K(E))
A5. ∩j∈JK(Ej) = K(∩j∈JEj) for any index set J and events Ej , j ∈ J
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A2, A3, and A4 are the obvious analogues of K2, K3, and K4, respectively. A1 can be
viewed as an analogue of K1. In fact, it is not hard to show that
K1′. K(ϕ ∧ ψ)⇔ (Kϕ ∧Kψ)
is equivalent to K1 in the presence of MP and Prop. We could have replaced K1 by K1′ in
all the axiom systems and still have obtained all the completeness proofs of Theorem 2.1.
Instead of A1, Aumann uses the monotonicity property
A1′. If E ⊆ F , the K(E) ⊆ K(F ).
It is easy to see that A1′ follows from A1 (since if E ⊆ F , then E ∩ F = E, so
K(E) ⊆ K(E) ∩ K(F ) ⊆ K(F )). A1 does not follow from A1′, but it follows from
Aumann’s set-theoretic completeness theorem that A1 does follow from A1′, A2, A3, and
A4; Proposition 2.2 provides a self-contained proof of this fact.
Note there is no analogue to Prop, MP, or Gen above; they turn out to be unnecessary
at the set-theoretic level. (In particular, once we work at the level of sets, we do not
need the Boolean equivalences encoded in Prop as axioms.) On the other hand, there
is no analogue of A5 at the syntactic level; we cannot express infinite conjunctions in
propositional logic, so it is unnecessary. It turns out that A5 is also unnecessary if we
assume that K is an equivalence relation. This follows from the following result.
Proposition 2.2: Any operator on events in W that satisfies A1′, A2, and A4 must also
satisfy A5 (and hence A1).
5If J = ∅, we take the intersection over the empty set to be W , as usual. Thus, as a special case of
this axiom, we get W = K(W ).
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Proof: Suppose K satisfies A1′, A2, and A4. Consider the fixed points of K, that is,
those sets E such that K(E) = E. I first show that the set of fixed points of K is closed
under negations and arbitrary unions.
Suppose K(E) = E. Then ¬E = ¬K(E), so K(¬E) = K(¬K(E)) = ¬K(E) = ¬E,
where the second equality follows from A2 and A4. Thus, ¬E is a fixed point of K.
Next, suppose K(Ej) = Ej for all j in some index set J . Since Ej ⊆ ∪jEj , by A1
′, we
have K(Ej) ⊆ K(∪jEj). Thus,
∪jK(Ej) ⊆ K(∪jEj). (4)
It now follows that
K(∪j∈JEj)
= K(∪j∈JK(Ej)) since Ej = K(Ej)
⊆ K(K(∪j∈JEj)) by A1
′ and (4)
⊆ K(∪j∈JEj) by A2.
Thus, K(∪j∈JEj) = KK(∪j∈JEj), and the set of fixed points of K is closed under arbitrary
unions.
We are now ready to prove A5. Since ∩j∈JEj ⊆ Ej, it follows from A1
′ that
K(∩j∈JEj) ⊆ K(Ej). Thus, K(∩j∈JEj) ⊆ ∩j∈JK(Ej). For the opposite inclusion, observe
that by A2, we have ∩j∈JK(Ej) ⊆ ∩j∈JEj. Thus, by A1
′, K(∩j∈JK(Ej)) ⊆ K(∩j∈JEj).
By A2 and A4, ¬K(Ej) is a fixed point of K, for all j ∈ J . Since the set of fixed points
is closed under arbitrary unions and negations, ∩j∈JK(Ej) is also a fixed point of K. It
follows that ∩j∈JK(Ej) ⊆ K(∩j∈JEj), as desired.
Each of A1′, A2, and A4 is necessary for Proposition 2.2. If we drop any of them,
then A5 no longer necessarily holds, as the following examples show.
Example 2.3: Let W = {1, 2, 3} and define K0({1}) = K0({2, 3}) = ∅, and K0(E) = E
for E 6= {1}, {2, 3}. It is easy to see that K0 satisfies A2 and A4, but not A1
′ (since
{3} ⊆ {2, 3} but K0({3}) = {3} 6⊆ ∅ = K0({2, 3})). Since K0 does not satisfy A1
′, a
fortiori, it does not satisfy A1 or A5.
Example 2.4 : Let W = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Define K1(E) = E if E is cofinite (that is,
if the complement of E is finite) and K1(E) = ∅ otherwise. It is easy to see that
K1 satisfies A1 (and hence A1
′) and A2, but does not satisfy A4 (since, for example,
¬K1(¬{1}) = {1} 6= ∅ = K(¬K(¬{1})). K1 does not satisfy A5, since if Ej = ¬{j}, then
K1(∩j≥1Ej) = K1({1}) = ∅ 6= {1} = ∩j≥1K1(Ej).
Example 2.5: Let W = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Define K2(E) =W if E is cofinite and K2(E) = ∅
otherwise. Again, it is easy to see that K2 satisfies A1 and A4, but does not satisfy A2
(since, for example, K2(¬{1}) = W 6⊆ ¬{1}). Taking Ej = ¬{j} as in the previous
example, note that K2 does not satisfy A5 since K2(∩jEj) = ∅ 6=W = ∩jK2(Ej).
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The following theorem is the set-theoretic analogue of Theorem 2.1. Aumann [1989]
proved it for the case that M ∈Mrst and K satisfies A1′, A2–A4; this is a generalization
of his result. (In light of Proposition 2.2, we can replace A1′ by A1.) It is just the result
we would expect (modulo, perhaps, the need for A5 if we do not have all of A1, A2, and
A4).
Theorem 2.6: The K operator in the frame (W,K) satisfies A5. Moreover, if K is
reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; Euclidean and transitive; an equivalence relation)
then K satisfies A2 (resp., A2 and A3; A3 and A4; A1–A4). Conversely, if K′ is an
operator on events satisfying A5, then there is a binary relation K on W such that K′
is the K relation in the frame (W,K). Moreover, if K′ satisfies A2 (resp., A2 and A3;
A3 and A4; A1–A4), then K is reflexive (resp., reflexive and transitive; Euclidean and
transitive; an equivalence relation).
Proof: The first part is straightforward and left to the reader. For the second part,
given an operator K′ on W , define K so that K(w) = ∩{E : w ∈ K′(E)}. Using the
fact that in all cases K′ satisfies A5, it is easy to check that K and K′ agree. And just
as in the standard canonical model constructions of completeness in the syntactic case
(see, e.g., [Fagin, Halpern, Moses, and Vardi 1995]), we can show that A2 forces K to be
reflexive, A3 forces it to be transitive, and A4 forces it to be Euclidean. The result follows.
(Note that a reflexive, Euclidean, and transitive relation is an equivalence relation.)
This theorem is a typical example of a set-theoretic soundness and completeness
result. The first part can be viewed as a soundness statement, while the second part
gives us completeness.
The reader familiar with the standard syntactic completeness proofs using canonical
model constructions should find it instructive to compare the set-theoretic completeness
proofs with those involving canonical models. The set-theoretic proofs works for an
arbitrary set W of worlds; we do not have to construct a special set where each world
corresponds to a maximal consistent set of formulas. The definition of the K relation
above is very similar in spirit to that in the canonical model construction, as are the
arguments that A2, A3, and A4 force the K relation to be reflexive, transitive, and
Euclidean, respectively. However, the proof that K = K′ is simpler than the proof that
a formula is true at a world in the canonical model if and only if it is an element of
that world (viewed as a maximal consistent set of formulas). As we shall see, in the case
of conditional logic, set-theoretic completeness proofs are also relatively simpler than
syntactic ones.
I have said we can view Theorem 2.6 as a set-theoretic soundness and completeness
result. The standard soundness and completeness results in logic involve a language,
a proof theory, and a semantics. Is there a way we can view Theorem 2.6 as a more
standard soundness and completeness result? I briefly sketch here an argument showing
that we can.
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Fix a finite set of worlds W0. The set of event descriptions (for W0) is the least set
formed as follows: We have a symbol A for each subset A of W0, and close off under
union, complementation, and applications of the K operator. Of course, we take E1 ∩ E2
to be an abbreviation for ¬(¬E1 ∪ ¬E2). A basic event formula (for W0) has the form
E1 = E2, where E1 and E2 are event descriptions. Note that E1 ⊆ E2 can be viewed as an
abbreviation for the basic event formula E1 ∩ E2 = E1. An event formula (for W0) is a
Boolean combination of basic event formulas. Our language consists of event formulas.
Note that the language is relative to the particular domain W0 about which we wish to
reason.
A semantic model for this language consists of an interpretation of K as an operator
on subsets of W0. This allows us to associate with each event description E a subset v(E)
of W0 in the obvious way. Of course, each symbol A is interpreted as the corresponding
subset A of W0 (that is, v(A) = A). Union and complementation get there standard
interpretation, and the interpretation of K(E) is determined by the interpretation of K.
Finally, a basic event formula E1 = E2 is true relative to an interpretation if v(E1) = v(E2).
Boolean combinations of event formulas are interpreted in the obvious way.
As for the axiom system, besides considering A1–A4 (or some subset of these axioms),
we need Prop and MP from the axiom system K for propositional reasoning, an axiom
that says K(E) is equal to some subset of W0, axioms describing the relationship between
subsets of W0, and axioms and inference rules for dealing with equality. The axiom that
says K(E) is equal to some subset of W0 is simply
A6. ∪A⊆W0K(E) = A.
The axioms describing the relationship between subsets of W0 have the following form:
for all subsets A,B,C ⊆W0, if A∪B = C, then we have an axiom A∪ B = C; similarly,
if B = ¬A, we have the axiom B = ¬A. Call this collection of axioms Rel.
Finally, we need axioms that say equality is an equivalence relation (reflexive, sym-
metric, and transitive), and an inference rule that allows us to substitute equals for
equals. Call these three axioms and inference rule Eq.
Let A be the axiom system consisting of A1, A6, Prop, MP, Rel, and Eq.
Corollary 2.7: Let A′ be a subset of A2, A3, A4. Then A∪A′ is a sound and complete
axiomatization for the set of frames of the form (W0,K) where K satisfies the subset of
{reflexive, transitive, Euclidean} corresponding to A′.
Proof: Soundness is obvious. For completeness, it suffices to show that if ϕ is an
event formula that is consistent with A ∪ A′, then ϕ is satisfied in a frame (W0,K)
where K satisfies the appropriate properties. But this follows almost immediately from
Theorem 2.6. Extend ϕ to a maximal complete subset of event formulas. This set of
formulas defines an operator K on events satisfying A1 (and hence A5, since W0 is finite).
Thus, by Theorem 2.6, there is a binary relation K on W0 with the right properties.
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IfW0 is infinite rather than finite, it seems that to prove a result like Corollary 2.7, we
need to allow arbitrary unions rather than just finite unions and arbitrary disjunctions
(to express the analogue of A6). I conjecture that a completeness proof exists even if we
restrict the language to finite disjunctions, although I have not checked details. In any
case, Corollary 2.7 does show that it is legitimate to view Theorem 2.6 as a semantic
counterpart of the more usual soundness and completeness results.6
3 Conditional logic
As I said earlier, conditional logic has been used to capture both counterfactual rea-
soning and default reasoning. Stalnaker [1992] gives a short and readable survey of the
philosophical issues involved. I briefly review the standard syntax and semantics here.
3.1 The Syntactic Approach: Selection Functions
As suggested above, the syntax for conditional logic is straightforward. We start with a
set Φ of primitive propositions, and close it off under conjunction, negation, and applica-
tions of the binary modal operator →. Thus, if ϕ and ψ are formulas, then so is ϕ→ ψ.
The formula ϕ→ ψ, can be read as “if ϕ were the case, then ψ would be true” (if we want
to give → a counterfactual reading) or “typically/normally/by default, if ϕ is the case
then ψ is the case” (if we want to give it a reading more appropriate for nonmonotonic
reasoning). Let LC be the set of formulas that can be built up this way.
The original approach for capturing →, due to Stalnaker and Thomason [Stalnaker
1968; Stalnaker and Thomason 1970], proceeds as follows: Given a language LC , they
assume that there is a selection function f :W×LC 7→W . For counterfactual reasoning,
we can think of f(w, ϕ) as the world “closest” to w that satisfies ϕ. For default reasoning,
f(w, ϕ) should be thought of as the most normal world (relative to w) satisfying ϕ. These
interpretations implicitly assume that there is a unique world closest to w (or most normal
relative to w) that satisfies E. Many later authors argued that there is not in general a
unique closest world; ties should be allowed. I follow this interpretation here. Thus, I
take a counterfactual structure to be a tuple (W, f, pi), where f : W × LC 7→ 2W and pi
is an interpretation, as before.
The definition of |= in counterfactual structures is the same as that in epistemic
structures, except for the clause for →, which is
(M,w) |= ϕ→ ψ iff f(w, ϕ) ⊆ [[ψ]]M .
This captures the intuition that the closest worlds to w, as defined by f , satisfy ϕ.
There are various restrictions we can consider placing on the selection function.
6I thank Giacomo Bonanno for raising this issue.
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S1. f(w, ϕ) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M : the worlds closest to w satisfying ϕ are in fact ϕ-worlds (where w
is a ϕ-world if w ∈ [[ϕ]]M ).
S2. If f(w, ϕ) ⊆ [[ψ]]M and f(w, ψ) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M , then f(w, ϕ) = f(w, ψ). Stalnaker and
Thomason [1970] view this as a uniformity condition. If the closest ϕ-worlds all
satisfy ψ and the closest ψ-worlds all satisfy ϕ, then the closest ϕ-worlds and the
closest ψ-worlds must be the same. Note that S1 and S2 together force f to be a
semantic function: if [[ϕ]]M = [[ψ]]M , then, in the presence of S1, the antecedent to
S2 will hold, so f(w, ϕ) = f(w, ψ).
S3. If w ∈ [[ϕ]]M , then f(w, ϕ) = {w}: if w is a ϕ-world, then it is the closest ϕ-world
to w. This restriction is particularly appropriate for counterfactual reasoning. It is
not necessarily appropriate for nonmonotonic reasoning. The most normal ϕ-world
may not be w, even if w is a ϕ-world.
S4. f(w, ϕ) is either empty or a singleton. This captures Stalnaker’s original assump-
tion that there is a unique closest world, if there is a closest world at all.
S5. f(w, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) ⊆ f(w, ϕ1) ∪ f(w, ϕ2): if w
′ is one of the (ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)-worlds closest to
w, then it must be one of the ϕ1-worlds closest to w or one of the ϕ2-worlds closest
to w.
S6. If f(w, ϕ) ⊆ [[ψ]]M then f(w, ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ f(w, ϕ): if the closest ϕ-worlds to w all
satisfy ψ, then the closest ϕ ∧ ψ-worlds are all among the closest ϕ-worlds to w.7
S7. If f(w, ϕ) ∩ [[ψ]]M 6= ∅, then f(w, ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ f(w, ϕ) ∩ [[ψ]]M : this is a strengthening
of S5 (at least, when f(w, ϕ) 6= ∅), which says that the closest ϕ ∧ ψ-worlds to w
are among the closest ϕ-worlds that are also in [[ψ]]M (provided there are any).
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S8. If [[ϕ]]M 6= ∅ then f(w, ϕ) 6= ∅: this says that there always is some ϕ-world closest
to w if there are any ϕ-worlds.
As we shall see in Section 3.3, if we introduce an ordering on worlds and define f(w, ϕ)
as the ϕ-worlds closest to w, then these restrictions arise by taking some very natural
restrictions on the ordering (indeed, restrictions S1, S2, S5, and S6 are forced on us).
There is a well-known axiom corresponding to each of these conditions except for S8.
Let ✷ϕ be an abbreviation for ¬ϕ → false and let ✸ϕ be an abbreviation of ¬✷¬ϕ.
7It may seem even more reasonable to replace ⊆ by = here. This would say that if the closest
ϕ-worlds to w satisfy ψ, then they are the closest ϕ ∧ ψ-worlds. In fact, the stronger version of S6
already follows from S1, S2, and S5. (Proof: By S1, S2, and S5, f(w,ϕ) = f(w, (ϕ ∧ ψ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ)) ⊆
f(w,ϕ∧ψ)∪f(w,ϕ∧¬ψ). Moreover, if f(w,ϕ) ⊆ [[ψ]], it follows from S1 that f(w,ϕ)∩f(w,ϕ∧¬ψ) = ∅.
Thus, f(w,ϕ) ⊆ f(ϕ∧ψ).) Note that S2 can easily be obtained from S1 and the stronger version of S6.
I use the weaker version of S6 here because it allows us to make technical connections to some known
results in conditional logic.
8Again, we may want to strengthen ⊆ to =, and again, the stronger version follows from the weaker
version, in the presence of S1, S2, and S5.
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Thus, (M,w) |= ✷ϕ iff f(w,¬ϕ) = ∅ and (M,w) |= ✸ϕ iff f(w, ϕ) 6= ∅. Consider the
following axioms:
Prop. All substitution instances of propositional tautologies
C0. ((ϕ→ ψ1) ∧ (ϕ→ ψ2))⇒ (ϕ→ (ψ1 ∧ ψ2))
C1. ϕ→ ϕ
C2. ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ))⇒ ((ϕ→ σ)⇒ (ψ → σ))
C3. ϕ⇒ (ψ ⇔ (ϕ→ ψ))
C4. (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ϕ→ ¬ψ)
C5. ((ϕ1 → ψ) ∧ (ϕ2 → ψ))⇒ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)→ ψ)
C6. ((ϕ1 → ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ1 → ψ))⇒ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→ ψ)
C7. (¬(ϕ1 → ¬ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ1 → ψ))⇒ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→ ψ)
C8. (a) ✷ϕ⇒ (ϕ ∧ (ϕ′ → ✷ϕ))
(b) ✸ϕ⇒ (ϕ′ → ✸ϕ)
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ
RC1. From ψ ⇒ ψ′ infer (ϕ→ ψ)⇒ (ϕ→ ψ′)
All of the axioms other than C8 above are familiar from the literature. In the language
of [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990], C0 is the And Rule, C1 is Reflexivity, C5 is
the Or Rule, C6 is Cautious Mononotonicity, C7 is Rational Monotonicity, and RC1
is Right Weakening. In [Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990] the focus was default
reasoning, for which C0, C1, C5, C6, C7, and RC1 are considered appropriate. C2, C3,
and C4 come from the literature on counterfactual reasoning; they are A6, t4.9, and t4.7
in [Stalnaker and Thomason 1970], respectively. There is one other rule considered in
[Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 1990] called Left Logical Equivalence, which says
LLE. From ϕ⇔ ϕ′ infer (ϕ→ ψ)⇒ (ϕ′ → ψ)
This is true if f is a semantic notion, which depends only on [[ϕ]]M , and not the syntactic
form of ϕ. As we have observed, this follows from S1 and S2. Not surprisingly, LLE
follows readily from C1, C2, and RC1. We can also obtain C2 from C0, C1, C5, C6,
RC1, and LLE, with a little effort, thus C2 holds in the framework of [Kraus, Lehmann,
and Magidor 1990].
C8 is intended to characterize S8. Basically, we want to say that if [[ϕ]]M 6= ∅ (i.e., ϕ
is satisfiable somewhere in structure M) then ✸ϕ must be valid in M (that is, true at
every world in M). Equivalently, if M |= ✷ϕ, then ¬ϕ must be unsatisfiable in M . The
following discussion may help explain how C8 captures this.
Given a structure M = (W, f, pi), define w′ to be reachable from w via ϕ if w′ ∈
f(w, ϕ). We can then inductively define reachability via a sequence ϕ1; . . . ;ϕk. If k > 1,
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w′ is reachable from w via ϕ1; . . . ;ϕk if there exists w
′′ such that w′ is reachable from w′′
via ϕk and w
′′ is reachable from w via ϕ1; . . . ;ϕk−1. Finally, we say that w
′ is reachable
from w if it is reachable via some sequence of formulas. Notice that (M,w) |= ϕ1 →
(ϕ2 → (. . . (ϕk → ϕ) . . .)) if ϕ is true at every world w
′ reachable from w via ϕ1; . . . ;ϕk.
Lemma 3.1: Suppose C8 is valid in M .
(a) If (M,w) |= ✷ϕ, then (M,w′) |= ϕ ∧ ✷ϕ for every w′ reachable from w via any
sequence of formulas.
(b) If (M,w) |= ✸ϕ, then (M,w′) |= ✸ϕ for every w′ reachable from w via any sequence
of formulas.
Proof: For part (a), note that part (a) of C8 says that if (M,w) |= ✷ϕ, then (M,w′) |=
✷ϕ for every world w′ reachable from w via ϕ′. Inductively, it follows that (M,w′) |= ✷ϕ
for every world w′ reachable from w via any sequence of formulas. Since C8 also tells us
that ✷ϕ ⇒ ϕ is valid, this means that ϕ is true at all worlds reachable from w via any
sequence of formulas. Part (b) follows similarly from part (b) of C8.
As the following theorem shows, the observation in Lemma 3.1 is enough to essentially
force S8.9
Theorem 3.2: Let S be a (possibly empty) subset of {S1, . . . , S8} and let C be the
corresponding subset of {C1, . . . , C8}. Then {Prop,C0,MP,RC1} ∪ C is a sound and
complete axiomatization for the language LC with respect to the class of counterfactual
structures satisfying the conditions in S.
Proof: As usual, soundness is straightforward. While the basic ideas of the completeness
proof are standard (and go back to [Stalnaker and Thomason 1970]), I sketch some of
the details here, since this result is somewhat more general than the ones that appear
in the literature. I assume that the reader is familiar with the standard canonical model
arguments from the literature.
For completeness, we must show that every consistent formula is satisfiable. Suppose
that ϕ0 is consistent. We first consider the case that C8 /∈ C.
Let W consist of all the maximal consistent sets of formulas in LC . Let g : W ×LC 7→
2L
C
be defined via g(w, ϕ) = {ψ : ϕ → ψ ∈ w}. Define a selection f on W so that
9In the presence of C1, C5, C6, RC1, and LLE, C8 can be expressed in more familiar terms. It is
easy to see that in the presence of C1, C5, C6, RC1, and LLE, ✷ϕ ⇒ (ψ → ϕ) is valid. (Proof: From
C1, we have (ϕ∧ψ)→ (ϕ∧ψ). By RC1, we have (ϕ∧ψ)→ ϕ. From ¬ϕ→ false (✷ϕ) and RC1 we have
¬ϕ→ ϕ and ¬ϕ→ ψ. From C6, we get that ¬ϕ∧ψ → ϕ. Now by C5, we get ((¬ϕ∧ψ)∨ (ϕ∧ψ)) → ϕ.
Finally, by LLE, we get ψ → ϕ.) Thus, C8 follows from (✷ϕ ⇒ (✷✷ϕ ∧ ϕ)) ∧ (✸ϕ ⇒ ✷✸ϕ). This is
a conjunction of two axioms denoted R (for reflexivity) and U (for uniformity) by Lewis [1973]. The
converse holds as well; this follows from Theorem 3.2.
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f(w, ϕ) = {w′ : g(w, ϕ) ⊆ w′}, and define an interpretation pi such that pi(w, p) = true
iff p ∈ w. Let M = (W, f, pi).
We can now prove the usual Truth Lemma: for every formula ϕ ∈ LC , we have
(M,w) |= ϕ iff ϕ ∈ w. We proceed by induction; the only nontrivial case comes if ϕ has
the form ψ1 → ψ2. If ψ1 → ψ2 ∈ w, we want to show that (M,w) |= ψ1 → ψ2. Thus,
we must show that f(w, ψ1) ⊆ [[ψ2]]M . By definition, f(w, ψ1) = {w
′ : g(w, ψ1) ⊆ w
′}.
Since ψ1 → ψ2 ∈ w, it follows that ψ2 ∈ g(w, ψ1), so f(w, ψ1) ⊆ {w
′ : ψ2 ∈ w
′}. By the
induction hypothesis, {w′ : ψ2 ∈ w
′} = [[ψ2]]M . Thus, (M,w) |= ψ1 → ψ2, as desired.
For the opposite direction, suppose (M,w) |= ψ1 → ψ2. Thus, f(w, ψ1) ⊆ [[ψ2]]M . It
follows that ψ2 must be provable from the formulas in g(w, ψ), for otherwise there would
be a world w′ containing g(w, ψ1) and ¬ψ2, and w
′ would be in f(w, [[ψ1]]M) − [[ψ2]]M ,
by the induction hypothesis. Thus, there is a finite set of formulas in g(w, ψ1), say
{σ1, . . . , σk}, such that σ1 ∧ . . . ∧ σk ⇒ ψ2 is provable. Since ψ1 → σj ∈ w, j = 1, . . . , k,
it follows from C0 that ψ1 → (σ1 ∧ . . . ∧ σk) ∈ w. Now applying RC1, we get that
ψ1 → ψ2 ∈ w, as desired.
It follows that ϕ0 is satisfiable in M .
Now we have to show that f satisfies all the properties in S. The arguments are
straightforward. I consider three representative cases here.
C1: Suppose that C1 ∈ C. We want to show that S1 holds. Thus, we must show that
f(w, ϕ) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M . By definition, if w
′ ∈ f(w, ϕ), then g(w, ϕ) ⊆ w′. If C1 holds,
then ϕ ∈ g(w, ϕ). Thus, if w′ ∈ f(w, ϕ), then ϕ ∈ w′. By the Truth Lemma,
w′ ∈ [[ϕ]]M .
C4: Suppose that C4 ∈ C and f(w, ϕ) 6= ∅. We want to show that f(w, ϕ) is a singleton.
Suppose that w1 6= w2 are both in f(w, ϕ). Thus g(w, ϕ) ⊆ w1 ∩ w2. There must
be some formula ψ such that ψ ∈ w1 and ¬ψ ∈ w2. It follows from C4 that either
(M,w) |= ϕ → ψ or (M,w) |= ϕ → ¬ψ. In the former case, ψ ∈ g(w, ϕ), while in
the latter case, ¬ψ ∈ g(w, ϕ). Either way, it follows that g(w, ϕ)− w1 ∩ w2 6= ∅, a
contradiction.
C6: Suppose C6 ∈ C and f(w, ϕ) ⊆ [[ψ]]M . We want to show that f(w, ϕ∧ψ) ⊆ f(w, ϕ).
Suppose that w′ ∈ f(w, ϕ ∧ ψ). This means that g(w, ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ w′. To show that
w′ ∈ f(w, ϕ), we need to show that g(w, ϕ) ⊆ w′. But if σ ∈ g(w, ϕ), then
ϕ → σ ∈ w. By C6, it follows that (ϕ ∧ ψ) → σ ∈ w, so σ ∈ g(w, ϕ ∧ ψ). Since
g(w, ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆ w′, it follows that σ ∈ w′. Thus, g(w, ϕ) ⊆ w′, as desired.
Finally, we must deal with the case that C8 ∈ C. Let w0 be a world in M such that
ϕ0 ∈ w0. (Recall that ϕ0 is the formula which we are trying to show is satisfiable.) LetW
′
consist of all worlds in W reachable from w0. It is almost immediate from the definitions
that if w′ ∈ W ′, then f(w′, ϕ) ⊆ W ′ for all formulas ϕ. Let f ′ and pi′ be the restrictions
of f and pi to W ′, respectively, and let M(w0) = (W
′, f ′, pi′). The Truth Lemma holds
for W ′; the proof above goes through without change. Similarly the arguments that all
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the properties in S other than S8 hold in M(w0) go through without change. Thus, ϕ0
is satisfiable in M(w0), and all the properties in S other than S also hold in M(w0).
To see that S8 also holds in M(w0), suppose that [[ϕ]]M(w0) 6= ∅. We want to show
that f(w, ϕ) 6= ∅ for all w ∈ W ′, or equivalently, that (M(w0), w) |= ✸ϕ. Since all
worlds in W ′ are reachable from w0, there must be two sequences of worlds, w1, . . . , wk
and w′0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
m, and two sequences of formulas, ϕ1, . . . , ϕk and ϕ
′
1, . . . , ϕ
′
m such that
wk = w, w
′
0 = w0, (M(w0), w
′
m) |= ϕ, wj is reachable from wj−1 via ϕj , for j = 1, . . . , k,
and w′j is reachable from w
′
j−1 via ϕ
′
j from j = 1, . . . , m. We must have (M(w0), w
′
0) |=
✸ϕ, for otherwise, by definition, we have (M(w0), w
′
0) |= ✷¬ϕ, and it would follow by
part (a) of Lemma 3.1 that (M(w0), w
′
m) |= ¬ϕ, a contradiction. Since w
′
0 = w0, we
have that (M(w0), w0) |= ✸ϕ. Now aplying part (b) of Lemma 3.1, it follows that
(M(w0), wk) |= ✸ϕ. Since wk = w¡ we get the desired result.
3.2 The Set-Theoretic Approach: Selection Functions
In the set-theoretic approach, rather than having a syntactic operator →, we have a
binary operator
e
→ on events (the superscript e stands for event); that is
e
→: 2W × 2W →
2W . For ease of exposition, I write H
e
→ E instead of
e
→ (H,E). Intuitively, w ∈ H
e
→ E
if, at world w, if H were to hold, then so would E. Again, we can give semantics to
e
→
using selection functions, but since we no longer have formulas, we replace the formula
that is the second argument in the syntactic case by a set of worlds (which we can think
of as the intension of a formula). Thus, a (set-theoretic) selection function maps W ×2W
to 2W .
A (set-theoretic) counterfactual structure is then a pair M = (W, f), where W is a set
of worlds and f is a set-theoretic selection function.
We can then define the binary operator
e
→: 2W × 2W 7→ 2W in M as follows:
H
e
→ E = {w : f(w,H) ⊆ E}. (5)
We can define restrictions on f completely analogous to those defined in the syntactic
case. These are listed below, along with one additional restriction, S9′.
S1′. f(w,H) ⊆ H
S2′. If f(w,H) ⊆ H ′ and f(w,H ′) ⊆ H , then f(w,H) = f(w,H ′)
S3′. If w ∈ H , then f(w,H) = {w}
S4′. f(w,H) is either empty or a singleton
S5′. f(w,H1 ∪H2) ⊆ f(w,H1) ∪ f(w,H2)
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S6′. If f(w,H) ⊆ E then f(w,H ∩ E) ⊆ f(w,H)10
S7′. If f(w,H) ∩ E 6= ∅, then f(w,H ∩ E) ⊆ f(w,H) ∩ E
S8′. If H 6= ∅ then f(w,H) 6= ∅
S9′. If f(w,H) ⊆ E1∪E2, then there exist H1, H2 such thatH1∪H2 = H , f(w,H1) ⊆ E1,
and f(w,H2) ⊆ E2
S9′ has no analogue in the syntactic case. Since S5′ is easily seen to be equivalent to
“if there exist H1, H2 such that H1 ∪ H2 = H , f(w,H1) ⊆ E1, and f(w,H2) ⊆ E2, then
f(w,H) ⊆ E1∪E2”, S9
′ can be viewed as a converse to S5′. It is also not hard to see that
S9′ follows from S1′ and S7′. (Proof: if H ∩ E1 6= ∅ and H ∩ E2 6= ∅, then we can take
H1 = H ∩ E1 and H2 = H ∩ (E2 ∪ ¬H1); if H ∩ E1 = ∅, we can take H1 = ∅, H2 = E,
and similarly if H ∩ E2 = ∅.) As we shall see, S9
′ arises (along with S1′, S2′, S5′, and
S6′) when the selection function f is induced by an ordering on worlds.
Each of these restrictions corresponds to an axiom, completely analogous to C0–C8.
Consider the following axioms:
C0′. ∩j∈J(H
e
→ Ej) = H
e
→ ∩j∈JEJ for any index set J and events Ej, j ∈ J
C1′. (H
e
→ H) = W
C2′. (H
e
→ H ′) ∩ (H ′
e
→ H) ∩ (H
e
→ E) ⊆ (H ′
e
→ E)
C3′. H ∩ (H
e
→ E) = H ∩ E
C4′. (H
e
→ E) ∪ (H
e
→ ¬E) = W
C5′. (H1
e
→ E) ∩ (H2
e
→ E) ⊆ (H1 ∪H2)
e
→ E
C6′. (H
e
→ E1) ∩ (H
e
→ E2) ⊆ (H ∩ E1)
e
→ E2
C7′. ¬(H
e
→ ¬E1) ∩ (H
e
→ E2) ⊆ (H ∩ E1)
e
→ E2
C8′. H
e
→ ∅ = ∅ if H 6= ∅
C9′. H
e
→ (E1 ∪ E2) ⊆ ∪{H1,H2:H1∪H2=H}((H1
e
→ E1) ∩ (H2
e
→ E2))
We can now state and prove the semantic soundness and completeness result.
10Again, the stronger version, with ⊆ replaced by equality, follows from S1′, S2′, and S5′, using
arguments almost identical to the earlier ones. Similarly, a stronger version of S7′ follows from S1′, S2′,
and S5′.
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Theorem 3.3: Let S be a (possibly empty) subset of {S1′, . . . , S9′}, let C be the cor-
responding subset of {C1′,. . . , C9′}, and let W be a set of worlds. If f is a set-theoretic
selection function onW that satisfies the conditions in S and
e
→ is defined in (W, f) by (5),
then
e
→ satisfies C0′ and the axioms in C. Conversely, if the function ❀: 2W ×2W 7→ 2W
satisfies C0′ and the axioms in C, then there is a selection function f on W satisfying S
such that ❀ is the counterfactual operator
e
→ in (W, f).
Proof: It is easy to check that if f satisfies the conditions in S, then
e
→ satisfies C0′ and
all the conditions in C. For the second half, given a function ❀: 2W × 2W 7→ 2W that
satisfies C0′ and the axioms in C, define f(w,H) = ∩{E : w ∈ H ❀ E}. I leave it to the
reader to check that ❀ is the counterfactual operator
e
→ in (W, f) and satisfies S.
Again, a number of points are worth making. First, observe how C8′ captures S8′
far more directly than C8 captures S8. We did not have to struggle to find an axiom
corresponding to this condition. Next, observe that the completeness proof proceeds in
somewhat the same spirit as the syntactic completeness proof, but avoids the construc-
tion of a canonical model. It works whichever model we start with. An analogue to
Corollary 2.7 can also be proved, showing that, again, we are entitled to view Theo-
rem 3.3 as a soundness and completeness result. Finally, as I now show, we need the full
strength of C0′ for completeness.
Consider the obvious finitary analogue of C0′:
C10′. (H
e
→ E1) ∩ (H
e
→ E2) = H
e
→ (E1 ∩ E2)
I actually give two examples showing that we cannot in general replace C0′ with C10′.
The first is a simple example that satisfies C1′–C3′, C5′–C10′, but not C0′ (or C4′). Then
I give a somewhat more sophisticated example that satisfies all of C1′–C10′, but not C0′.
Since
e
→ must satisfy C0′, this shows that C10′ does not suffice, even in the presence of
all the other properties.
Example 3.4: Let W = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Define ❀ so that if w ∈ H , then w ∈ H ❀ E
iff w ∈ E; if w /∈ H , then w ∈ H ❀ E iff (a) H ∩ ¬E = ∅ or (b) H is infinite and
H∩¬E is finite. I leave to the reader the somewhat tedious (but straightforward) task of
checking the ❀ satisfies C1′–C3′, C5′–C10′. It does not satisfy C0′, since if Ej = ¬{j},
then E1 ❀ E1 = W and E1 ❀ Ej = Ej for j = 2, 2, 3, . . .. But ∩jEj = ∅, E1 ❀ ∅ = ∅,
and ∩j(E1 ❀ Ej) = {1}. Thus, C0
′ does not hold. Note that ❀ also does not satisfy
C4′ since, for example, ({1, 2}❀ {1}) ∪ ({1, 2}❀ ¬{1}) = {1, 2} 6= W .
Example 3.5: For this example, we need to review some material on filters and ultrafil-
ters [Bell and Slomson 1974]. A filter on W is a nonempty set U of subsets of W that is
closed under supersets (i.e., if E ∈ U and E ⊂ E ′, then E ′ ∈ U) and finite intersections,
and does not contain the empty set. An ultrafilter is a maximal filter, that is, a filter that
is not a subset of any other filter. A principal ultrafilter is an ultrafilter which consists of
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all the supersets of a particular element of W . (It is easy to check that this is indeed an
ultrafilter.) A nonprincipal ultrafilter is an ultrafilter that is not a principal ultrafilter.
Note that if U is an ultrafilter, then for any set H , either H or ¬H must be in U . From
this it follows that if H ∈ U , then for any set E, we must have that one of H ∩ E or
H ∩ ¬E is in U . (Proof: If neither is in U , then H , ¬H ∪E, and ¬H ∪ ¬E are all in U .
Since U is closed under finite intersections, it follows that ∅ ∈ U . This contradicts the
fact that U is a filter.)
Let U be a nonprincipal ultrafilter on W = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. (Nonprincipal ultrafilters on
W can be shown to exist using Zorn’s Lemma.) Define ❀′ as follows: w ∈ H ❀′ E if
and only if the following conditions hold:
(a) if w ∈ H , then w ∈ H ∩ E,
(b) if w /∈ H and H ∈ U , then H ∩ E ∈ U ,
(c) if w /∈ H and H /∈ U , then H = ∅ or min(H ∩E) = min(H) (where min(F ) denotes
the minimal element of F ).
Again, it is straightforward (but tedious) to show that❀′ satisfies C1′–C10′. For example,
to see that C4′ holds, we must show that, for all E, we have (H ❀′ E)∪(H ❀′ ¬E) =W .
We do a case-by-case analysis. If w ∈ H , then, by clause (a), then if w ∈ E, we also have
w ∈ H ❀′ E, by definition; otherwise, w ∈ H ❀′ ¬E. If w /∈ H and H ∈ U , then one of
H ∩E or H ∩¬E must be in U , since otherwise, since U is an ultrafilter, we would have
both ¬H∪E ∈ U and ¬H∪¬E ∈ U , from which it follows that ¬H ∈ U , contradicting the
assumption that H ∈ U . Finally, if w /∈ H and H /∈ U , then either min(H) = min(H∩E)
or min(H) = min(H ∩ ¬E). In all cases, we have w ∈ (H ❀′ E) ∪ (H ❀′ ¬E).
To see that ❀′ does not satisfy C0′, note that a nonprincipal ultrafilter can contain
only infinite sets, and so must contain all cofinite sets. Taking the sets Ei as in Exam-
ple 3.4, it follows that Ei and Ei∩Ej are both in U , for all i, j (since these are all cofinite
sets). It then follows from the definition that E1 ❀
′ E1 =W and E1 ❀
′ Ej = Ej . Thus,
we get a violation of C0′ just as in Example 3.4.
3.3 Preferential Orders
I have described f(w, ϕ) as the “closest” worlds to w satisfying ϕ. This suggests that
there is an underlying ordering on worlds. Lewis [1973] made this intuition explicit as
follows. A preferential frame is a pair (W,R), where R is a ternary preferential relation
on a set W of possible worlds. For technical reasons that will be discussed at the end
of this subsection, I assume that W is finite in this subsection. We typically write
w′ w w′′ rather than R(w,w′, w′′). This should be thought of as saying that w′ is at
least as close to w as w′′; thus, w represents the “at least as close to w” relation. Let
Ww = {w
′ : ∃w′′(w′ w w′′)}. We can think of Ww as the domain of 
w. Intuitively,
the worlds not in Ww are so far away from w that they cannot even be discussed. As
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would be expected from the intuition, we require that w be a partial preorder on Ww,
that is, a reflexive, transitive relation.11 We define the relation ≺w by taking w′ ≺w w′′
if w′ w w′′ and not(w′′ w w′).
Given our intuitions regarding closeness, the following requirements seem reasonable:
P1. w ∈ Ww and is the minimal element with respect to 
w (so that w is closer to itself
than any other element): formally, for all w′ ∈ Ww, we have w 
w w and w ≺w w′.
P2. w is a total preorder on Ww: that is, for all w
′, w′′ ∈ Ww, either w
′ w w′′ or
w′′ w w′.
P3. w is a linear order on Ww: that is, for all w
′, w′′ ∈ Ww, if w
′ 6= w′′, then either
w′ ≺w w′ or w′′ ≺w w′.
P4. Ww = W for all w ∈ W
In a preferential frame, we can define a (set-theoretic) selection function f such that
f(w,H) are the worlds closest to w, according to 
w, that are in H . Formally, we have
f(w,H) = {w
′ ∈ H ∩Ww : if w
′′ ≺w w′ then w′′ /∈ H}.
This gives us a way of defining a binary operator
e
→ in preferential frames, by an imme-
diate appeal to Definition (5).
We can also define a syntactic version (which is actually what Lewis did). A prefer-
ential structure is a tuple M = (W,R, pi), where (W,R) is a preferential frame and pi is
an interpretation. Roughly speaking, we would now like to define a syntactic selection
function f in M by taking
f(w, ϕ) = {w
′ ∈ [[ϕ]]M ∩Ww : if w
′′ ≺w w′ then w′′ /∈ [[ϕ]]M}, (6)
and then use this selection function to give semantics to conditional formulas. The only
problem is that we have not yet defined [[ϕ]]M . The formal definition does not use the
selection function directly. Nevertheless, it is easy to check that the formal definition is
consistent with this intuition.
Formally, the definition of |= in preferential structures is the same as that in counter-
factual structures, except for the clause for →, which is
(M,w) |= ϕ→ ψ if f(w, [[ϕ]]M) ⊆ [[ψ]]M
This is well-defined, since the inductive definition of |= guarantees that the sets [[ϕ]]M
and [[ψ]]M have already been defined. This definition makes precise the intuition that
11Note that w is not necessarily anti-symmetric. That is why it is a preorder, not an order. Nor is
it necessarily total; totality is forced by condition P2, which will be defined shortly.
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ϕ→ ψ holds at world w if the ϕ-worlds closest to w (according to the ordering w used
at w) all satisfy ψ.
The following syntactic completeness result is well known. It says that in preferential
structures, → satisfies C0, C1, C2, C5, C6, and RC1; moreover, P1, P2, P3, and P4 give
us C3, C7, C4, and C8, respectively.
Theorem 3.6: [Burgess 1981; Friedman and Halpern 1994; Lewis 1973] Let P be any
(possibly empty) subset of {P1,P2,P3,P4} let C be the corresponding subset of {C3,C7,C4,C8},
and letW be a finite set of worlds. LetMP be the class of preferential structures where the
ternary relation R satisfies the conditions in P. Then C∪{Prop, C0, C1, C2, C5, C6, MP, RC1}
is a sound and complete axiomatization for the language LC for the class of preferential
structures in MP .12
What about set-theoretic completeness? Not surprisingly in the light of the previous
theorem, it turns out that f satisfies S1
′, S2′, S5′, S6′; moreover, P1, P2, P3, and P4
correspond to S3′, S7′, S4′, and S8′, respectively. The interesting thing is that we also
get S9′.
Lemma 3.7: Let P be a subset of {P1,P2,P3,P4}, and let S be the corresponding subset
of {S4′,S7′,S4′,S8′}. If (W,R) is a preferential frame satisfying the properties in P, then
f satisfies S1
′, S2′, S5′, S6′, S9′ and all the properties in S.
Proof: Proving that f satisfies all the properties is straightforward. I consider only S9
′
here. To see that f satisfies S9
′, suppose f(w,H) ⊆ E1 ∪ E2. Let E
′
i = Ei ∩ f(w,H),
for j = 1, 2. Let EHj consist of all the elements in H that are at least as far from w
as some element in Ej. That is, E
H
j = {w
′ ∈ H : ∃w′′ ∈ E ′j(w
′′ w w′)} Then define
H1 = (E
H
1 − (E
′
2 − E
′
1)) ∪ (H −Ww) and H2 = (E
H
2 − (E
′
1 − E
′
2)) ∪ (H −Ww). It is
not hard to show that H = H1 ∪ H2. (Proof: By construction, A
H ⊆ H , so we must
have H1 ∪ H2 ⊆ H . For the opposite containment, note that if v ∈ H −Ww, then the
construction guarantees that v ∈ H1∩H2. Also note that E
′
j ∩Ww ⊆ E
H
j , since if v ∈ E
′
j
then v ∈ Ej ∩ H and if v ∈ Ww, then v 
w v. Thus, E ′j ⊆ Hj for j = 1, 2. Finally, if
v ∈ H ∩Ww − (E
′
1 ∪ E
′
2), then choose v
′ ∈ f(w,H) such that v
′ w v. Such a v′ must
exist by definition, v′ ∈ H by construction, and v′ ∈ E1 ∪ E2 since f(w,H) ⊆ E1 ∪ E2.
If v′ ∈ Ej , then we must have v ∈ E
H
j and hence v ∈ Hj.)
It remains to show that f(w,Hj) ⊆ Ej , j = 1, 2. I consider the case that j = 1.
(The proof for j = 2 is almost identical.) Suppose that v ∈ f(w,H1). Thus, v ∈
EH1 − (E
′
2 − E
′
1), since f(w,H1) ⊆ Ww. Since v ∈ E
H
1 , there exists some v
′ ∈ E ′1 such
that v′ w v. Since, as we observed above, E ′1 ⊆ H1, we have v
′ ∈ H1. Thus we cannot
have v′ ≺w v, for otherwise v /∈ f(w,Hj). Thus, v 
w v′. It follows that v ∈ f(w,H),
for otherwise there would be some v′′ ∈ E ′1 ∪ E
′
2 such that v
′′ ≺w v. This would mean
12Note that since C1, C5, C6, RC1, and LLE all hold (recall that LLE follows from C1, C2, and RC1),
we can replace C8 by the simpler (✷ϕ⇒ (✷✷ϕ ∧ ϕ)) ∧ (✸ϕ⇒ ✷✸ϕ).
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that v′′ ≺w v′, contradicting the fact that v′ ∈ E ′1. Thus, it follows that v ∈ E
′
1 ∪ E
′
2.
Since v ∈ H1, we cannot have v ∈ E
′
2 −E
′
1. Hence v ∈ E
′
1, as desired.
We then get the following set-theoretic soundness and completeness result. Note that
we can use C10′ instead of C0′, since we are restricting to finite sets of worlds.
Theorem 3.8: Let P be any (possibly empty) subset of {P1,P2,P3,P4}, let C be the
corresponding subset of {C3′,C7′,C4′,C8′}, and let W be a finite set of worlds. If R is a
ternary relation on W that satisfies the conditions in P then
e
→ satisfies C1′, C2′, C5′,
C6′, C9′, C10′, and all the axioms in C. Conversely, if ❀: 2W × 2W 7→ 2W and satisfies
C1′, C2′, C5′, C6′, C9′, C10′, and the axioms in C, then there is a ternary relation R
on W satisfying the conditions in P such that ❀ is the counterfactual operator
e
→ in
(W,R).
Proof: The first half (soundness) follow immediately from Lemma 3.7 and Theorem 3.3.
For the second half, suppose that ❀ satisfies C1′, C2′, C5′, C6′, C9′, C10′, and the
axioms in C. First assume that C7′ /∈ C. Define w′ w w′′ iff w ∈ {w′, w′′} ❀ {w′}
and w /∈ {w′, w′′} ❀ ∅. (This way of defining the ordering is essentially due to [Kraus,
Lehmann, and Magidor 1990]; a slightly different ordering for the case that C7′ is in C is
described at the end of the proof.) We must show that w is a partial order on Ww and
that the operator
e
→ determined by this relation agrees with ❀. The following lemma
will prove useful:
Lemma 3.9: Ww = {w
′ : w /∈ {w′}❀ ∅}.
Proof: Let W ′ = {w′ : w /∈ {w′} ❀ ∅}. If w′ ∈ W ′, then we have w′ w w′ (since, by
C1′, we must have w ∈ {w′} ❀ {w′}) and thus w′ ∈ Ww. Conversely, if w
′ ∈ Ww, then
there must be some w′′ such that w′ w w′′. Thus,
w ∈ {w′, w′′}❀ {w′} (7)
and
w /∈ {w′, w′′}❀ ∅. (8)
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that
w ∈ {w′}❀ ∅. (9)
From C0′ and (9), it follows that
w ∈ {w′}❀ {w′′}. (10)
By C1′, we have
w ∈ {w′′}❀ {w′′}. (11)
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By C5′ applied to (10) and (11), we have
w ∈ {w′, w′′}❀ {w′′}. (12)
Finally, from C10′ applied to (7) and (12), we get w ∈ {w′, w′′}❀ ∅. But this contradicts
(8).
It follows immediately from C1′ and Lemma 3.9 that w is reflexive on Ww. To show
that it is transitive, it is easy to see that it suffices to show that if E1, E2, E3 are disjoint
sets, then
((E1 ∪ E2)❀ E1) ∩ ((E2 ∪ E3)❀ E2) ⊆ ((E1 ∪ E3)❀ E1).
(Transitivity follows easily from the special case that Ej = {wj}, j = 1, 2, 3, where w1,
w2, and w3 are different worlds.)
For the proof, it is useful to have two preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 3.10: If E ⊆ E ′ then H ❀ E ⊆ H ❀ E ′.
Proof: If E ⊆ E ′, then by C10′ we have
(H ❀ E) ∩ (H ❀ E ′) = H ❀ (E ∩ E ′) = H ❀ E.
Lemma 3.11: (H1 ❀ E1) ∩ (H2 ❀ E2) ⊆ (H1 ∪H2)❀ (E1 ∪ E2).
Proof: Using Lemma 3.10 and C5′, we have
(H1 ❀ E1)∩(H2 ❀ E2) ⊆ (H1 ❀ (E1∪E2))∩(H2 ❀ (E1∪E2)) ⊆ (H1∪H2)❀ (E1∪E2).
From Lemma 3.11, we have that
((E1 ∪ E2)❀ E1) ∩ ((E2 ∪ E3)❀ E2) ⊆ (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)❀ (E1 ∪ E2) (13)
Applying C1′ and Lemma 3.11, we also get
(E1 ∪ E2)❀ E1 = ((E1 ∪ E2)❀ E1) ∩ (E3 ❀ E3) ⊆ (E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)❀ (E1 ∪ E3) (14)
Finally, using (13), (14), C10′, and C6′, we get
((E1 ∪ E2)❀ E1) ∩ ((E2 ∪ E3)❀ E2)
⊆ ((E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)❀ (E1 ∪ E2)) ∩ ((E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)❀ (E1 ∪ E3))
= ((E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)❀ E1) ∩ ((E1 ∪ E2 ∪ E3)❀ (E1 ∪ E3))
⊆ (E1 ∪ E3)❀ E1.
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Thus w is transitive, as desired.
Next, we must show that C3′, C4′, and C8′ give us P1, P2, and P4, respectively.
(Recall that I have deferred the case of C7′.)
Suppose that ❀ satisfies C3′. Then {w} ∩ ({w} ❀ ∅) = ∅, so w /∈ {w} ❀ ∅; thus,
w ∈ Ww by Lemma 3.9. Moreover, since {w,w
′} ∩ ({w,w′} ❀ {w}) = {w}, we have
w w w′ for all w′ ∈ Ww, showing that P1 holds.
If ❀ satisfies C4′, then (using C1′ and C10′), we have
W = {w′, w′′}❀ {w′} ∪ {w′, w′′}❀ (W − {w′})
= {w′, w′′}❀ {w′} ∪ ({w′, w′′}❀ (W − {w′}) ∩ {w′, w′′}❀ {w′, w′′})
= {w′, w′′}❀ {w′} ∪ {w′, w′′}❀ {w′′}.
It easily follows that for all w′, w′′ ∈ Ww, we have either w
′ w w′′ or w′′ w w′. Thus,
P2 holds.
Finally, it is immediate from the definitions that if ❀ satisfies C8′, then Ww = W .
It remains to check that
e
→ and ❀ agree. We prove that
H
e
→ E iff H ❀ E. (15)
Note that C1′, C2′, C5′, C6′, and C10′ hold for both
e
→ and ❀. For
e
→, this follows
from the first half of the theorem; for ❀, it follows by assumption. These are the only
properties used in the proof. Note that this means that Lemmas 3.10 and 3.11 apply to
both
e
→ and ❀.
Using C10′ and C1′, we have that H
e
→ E = H
e
→ (H ∩ E), and similarly for ❀;
thus, we can assume without loss of generality that E ⊆ H . We proceed by induction
on |E|. (Here we are making heavy use of the fact that W is finite.) If E = ∅, then if
H = ∅, the result follows from C1′. If H 6= ∅, then for each w′ ∈ H , we have
H ❀ ∅ = ((H ❀ ∅) ∩ (H ❀ {w′})) ⊆ {w′}❀ ∅.
Thus, we have
H ❀ ∅ ⊆ ∩w′∈H{w
′}❀ ∅.
By C5′, we actually have
H ❀ ∅ = ∩w′∈H{w
′}❀ ∅.
An identical argument works if we replace❀ by
e
→. Thus, it suffices to show that {w′}❀
∅ = {w′}
e
→ ∅. But, by Lemma 3.9, w ∈ {w′}❀ ∅ iff w′ /∈ Ww. It is also immediate from
the definitions that w′ /∈ Ww iff w ∈ {w
′}
e
→ ∅. Thus, {w′}❀ ∅ = {w′}
e
→ ∅, as desired.
If |E| = 1, suppose E = {w′}. We proceed by a subinduction on |H|. If |H| = 1,
then the result is immediate from C1′, since E ⊆ H . If |H| = 2, let H = {w′, w′′}.
If H ❀ E, there are a number of cases to consider. First suppose that w′, w′′ ∈ Ww.
Then w ∈ {w′, w′′}
e
→ {w′} iff w′ ≺w w′′, which implies w ∈ {w′, w′′} ❀ {w′} by
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definition. If w′ /∈ Ww then,by Lemma 3.9, we have w ∈ {w
′} ❀ ∅. By C1′, we have
w ∈ {w′′} ❀ {w′′}. Now by Lemma 3.11, we have w ∈ {w′, w′′} ❀ {w′′}. By C10′, it
follows that w ∈ {w′, w′′}❀ ∅. By the induction hypothesis, we have w ∈ {w′, w′′}
e
→ ∅,
and by Lemma 3.10, we have w ∈ {w′, w′′}
e
→ {w′}, as desired. Finally, if w′′ /∈ Ww, then
w ∈ {w′′} ❀ ∅. By the induction hypothesis, we have w ∈ {w′′}
e
→ ∅, and by C1′, we
have w ∈ {w′}
e
→ {w′}. Now by Lemma 3.11, we have w ∈ {w′, w′′}
e
→ {w′}, as desired.
For the converse, note that if w ∈ {w′, w′′}
e
→ {w′}, then either w′ ≺w w′′ or w′′ /∈ Ww.
If w′ ≺w w′′, then we have w ∈ {w′, w′′} ❀ {w′} by definition, while if w′′ /∈ Ww, then
by Lemma 3.9, we have w ∈ {w′′} ❀ ∅. Since, by C1′, we also have w ∈ {w′} ❀ {w′},
the desired result follows from Lemma 3.11.
To complete the subinduction, suppose |H| > 2. If w ∈ H ❀ {w′}, then by
Lemma 3.10, we also have w ∈ H ❀ {w′, w′′} for all w′′ ∈ H . Thus, by C6′, w ∈
{w′, w′′}❀ {w′} for all w′′ ∈ H . By the induction hypothesis, we have w ∈ {w′, w′′}
e
→
{w′} for all w′′ ∈ H . By C5′, we have w ∈ H
e
→ {w′}. A symmetric argument works for
the converse (replacing the roles of
e
→ and ❀).
Finally, suppose |E| > 1. Choose some w′ ∈ E. By C9′, we have that if w ∈ H
e
→ E,
then w ∈ (H1 ❀ (E − {w
′})) ∩ (H2
e
→ {w′}) for some H1, H2 such that H1 ∪ H2 = H .
By the induction hypothesis, H1
e
→ E−{w′} = H1 ❀ E−{w
′} and H2
e
→ {w′} = H2 ❀
{w′}. By Lemma 3.11, H1 ❀ E − {w
′} ∩ H2 ❀ {w
′} ⊆ H ❀ E. Thus, w ∈ H ❀ E.
The opposite containment is obtained by a symmetric argument.
Now we must deal with the case that C7′ ∈ C. The argument is similar in spirit to
that given in [Friedman and Halpern 1998]. In this case, w is not necessarily a total
order. However, we can show that ≺w is modular: if w1 ≺
w w2, then for all w3 ∈ Ww,
either w3 ≺
w w2 or w1 ≺
w w3. To see this, suppose w1 ≺
w w2 and it is not the case that
w3 ≺
w w2. Then
w ∈ {w1, w2}❀ {w1} (16)
and
w /∈ {w2, w3}❀ {w3}. (17)
Since w ∈ {w3}❀ {w3}, from (16) and Lemma 3.11 it follows that
w ∈ {w1, w2, w3}❀ {w1, w3}. (18)
We also must have
w ∈ {w1, w2, w3}❀ {w1}, (19)
for otherwise, we have w ∈ ¬({w1, w2, w3} ❀ ¬¬{w1}), so by C7
′ and (18), we would
have
w ∈ {w2, w3}❀ {w1, w3}. (20)
Since we also have w ∈ {w2, w3} ❀ {w2, w3}, an application of C10
′ gives us w ∈
{w2, w3}
e
→ {w3}, contradicting (17). From (18), (19), and C6
′, we immediately get
w ∈ {w1, w3}
e
→ {w1}. (21)
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We also cannot have w ∈ {w1, w3}
e
→ {w3}, for then by C10
′ and (21), we would
have w ∈ {w1, w3}
e
→ ∅. From Lemma 3.10, we then would get w ∈ {w1, w3}
e
→ {w3},
and from C6′, that w ∈ {w3}
e
→ ∅, contradicting the assumption that w3 ∈ Ww. We can
therefore conclude, using (21), that w1 ≺
w w3, giving us the desired modular order.
Once we have a modular order, we can easily define a total order from it. Define
w′ ≤w w′′ either if w′ ≺w w′′ or neither w′ ≺w w′′ nor w′′ ≺w w′ hold. It is a standard
result (and not hard to show) that ≤w is a total order if ≺w is modular. (See [Halpern
1997, Lemma 2.6] for a proof.) Moreover, it is easy to see w′ <w w′′ iff w′ ≺w w′′. Thus,
f≤ = f, so that if we use ≤
w to define the ternary relation, our previous argument
shows that
e
→ and ❀ still agree. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.8. Although
the proof is certainly nontrivial, it is still significantly simpler than the corresponding
syntactic proof (see, for example, [Burgess 1981; Friedman and Halpern 1994]).
I conclude with some remarks on the case that W is infinite. In this case, there may
not be a “closest” world to w satisfying ϕ. As a result, the definition of → used here
based on an ordering gives counterintuitive results. It is perhaps easier to understand
this issue in semantic terms, using the selection function f. For example, let W
∞ =
{0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞} and for all i, we have i + 1 ≺∞ i, that is, i + 1 is closer to ∞ than i.
Then if H = W − {∞}, we would have f(∞, H) = ∅ and ∞ ∈ H
e
→ ∅ according to the
definition above, because there is no world “closest” to ∞ in H . This does not accord
with the usual intuitions for
e
→.
This particular problem disappears if we require w to be well-founded, which means
that there are no infinitely descending w sequences of the form . . . wn 
w wn−1 
w
· · · w w0, as is essentially done by Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor [1990]. Lewis gives a
definition that seems to give us the properties we want even if w is not well-founded.
Roughly speaking, his definitions says that ϕ → ψ holds at w if all worlds sufficiently
close to w that satisfy ϕ also satisfy ψ. More precisely, Lewis defines→ as follows. Given
a preferential structure M = (W,R, pi), we have
(M,w) |= ϕ→ ψ, if for every world w1 ∈ [[ϕ]]M , there is a world w2 such that
(a) w2 
w w1 (so that w2 is at least as close to w as w1), (b) w2 ∈ [[ϕ ∧ ψ]]M ,
and (c) for all worlds w3 ≺
w w2, we have w3 ∈ [[ϕ⇒ ψ]]M (so any world closer
to w than than w2 that satisfies ϕ also satisfies ψ).
It is not hard to show that Lewis’s definition coincides with that given here if ≺ is well-
founded (and, in particular, if W is finite). Moreover, with this definition, Theorem 3.6
holds even if W is infinite (except that P3 has to be strengthened to require that w be
well founded as well as linear in order to get it to correspond to C4). Thus, it seems that
by taking Lewis’s definition, we get precisely the properties we want.
Unfortunately, as results of [Friedman, Halpern, and Koller 1996] show, appearances
here are somewhat deceiving. Lewis’s definition is still not appropriate for counterfactual
or nonmonotonic reasoning in infinite domains, once we have a rich enough language. In
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[Friedman, Halpern, and Koller 1996], the language considered is first-order conditional
logic, but the problems can be demonstrated using the set-theoretic approach as well.
We can easily define an operator
e
→ that captures Lewis’s definition, although it
does not correspond to a selection function. For example, C0′ does not hold with this
definition in general (even though it does hold if
e
→ is defined in terms of a selection
function). Consider the domain W∞ above, and let Hk = {k, k + 1, k + 2, . . .}. Then we
have ∞ ∈ H0
e
→ Hk for all k, but since ∩kHk = ∅, we have (H0
e
→ ∩kHk) = ∅.
The fact that C0′ does not hold in general is not bad. It is not clear that we want it for
counterfactual and nonmonotonic reasoning in the infinite case. For example, consider
a lottery. If we think of Ej as corresponding to “player j wins the lottery” and J as
being the set of players, then we might well want to have ∩j∈J(W
e
→ ¬Ej), which just
says that, for each player j in J , normally player j does not win the lottery (giving
e
→ a
normality reading) and, in addition, W
e
→ (∪j∈JEj), which says that normally someone
wins the lottery. But this is incompatible with C0′.
While Lewis’s definition does not force C0′, results of [Friedman, Halpern, and Koller
1996] show that other properties do hold with Lewis’s definition that are arguably just as
undesirable as C0′ in the infinite case. For example, it is easy to show that the following
property holds, for any index set J :
((∪j∈JHj)
e
→ ¬H1) ∩ ∩j∈J((H1 ∪Hj)
e
→ H1) = ∅. (22)
(22) encodes a variant of the lottery paradox. Consider a lottery with J players, where
player 1 has bought more tickets than any other player. It might then seem reasonable
to say that player 1 is more likely to win than any other player, but still unlikely to
win. If we think of Hi as corresponding to “player i wins the lottery” and we give
e
→ a
“typicality” reading, then this is exactly what the left-hand side of (22) says. However,
the fact that the right-hand side is the empty set says that this situation cannot happen,
according to Lewis’s definition.13
As shown in [Friedman, Halpern, and Koller 1996], there is another approach that
can be used for giving semantics to conditional logic that involves plausibility measures
[Friedman and Halpern 1998], which works appropriately even for first-order conditional
logic (with infinite domains). Of course, this approach too can be captured by a set-
theoretic approach, but the details of that would take us well beyond the scope of this
paper.
4 Conclusion
The goal of this paper is to show that we can still get the benefit of an axiomatic proof
theory even if we work at the semantic level. Indeed, at the semantic level we may
13If J is finite, then (22) follows easily from C5′, C8′, and C10′. It would follow from an infinitary
version of C5′ if J is infinite, but the infinitary version of C5′ does not follow from the other properties.
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get more axioms and easier completeness proofs. This should not be interpreted as an
argument to abandon the more traditional, syntactic approach. Syntactic methods have
their place, particularly when we do not have one fixed model in mind about which we
are reasoning. However, these results are further evidence showing that when we are
working with a fixed model, semantic reasoning can be a powerful tool.
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